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<CT>Sheltering Xenophobia 
<CA>R. R. Sundstrom 
 
<A>Introduction 
Xenophobia rises.1 Never disappearing, it recedes from prominence, and makes regular 
unwelcome returns. Unlike the proverbial unwanted guest who merely stays too long, 
xenophobia terrifies the host with the possibility that it will never leave, and forever ruins 
the act of hosting, sheltering, and giving sanctuary. Close the doors, give no shelter, tear 
down the sanctuary: this is what the majority desires.2 
 The hospitable minority, for those whom hospitality is either a sacred or ethical 
obligation or both, is overwhelmed by the masses’ noisy demands to shut the door. As if 
that were not enough, the inhospitable, using the same holy and constitutional texts, glory 
in denying sanctuary. They cry out in fear and worry that their country is being overrun, 
that it is under siege, and that denying hospitality to threatening foreigners is right and 
good. Foreigner hatred is justified and foreigner fear is embraced. Hence, the 
organization “Stop Islamisation of Europe” (SIOE) declares: “Racism is the lowest form 
of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of common sense.”3 
 SIOE’s message is clear: racism is evil, Islamophobia is not racism, ergo 
Islamophobia is not evil. This fallacious syllogism I call xenophobia’s double play: (1) 
xenophobia is compared to superficial templates of racism, and then (2) justified as 
nonracist. Racism is sidestepped, and xenophobia is eluded by its explicit absence. 
Muslims are condemned as a historic, monolithic, and invariable threat against every 
aspect of Western liberal democratic societies, and, thus, judged worthy of phobia. 
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Indeed, Islamophobia is judged, in contrast with racism, to be reasonable and rational, 
and the label “Islamophobe” is embraced as a rallying cry. Yet xenophobia lingers in the 
structure of the term Islam + phobia. Muslims simply and terrifyingly are the xenos in 
this instance. Moreover, and beyond this superficial syntactical similarity, the history of 
xenophobia lingers in this example. Just as other ethnic, racial, and religious groups have 
been demonized as a foreign, total threat, so do Muslims suffer this recent wave of fear 
and hatred. Do not be fooled by the submergence of the general term xenos in SIOE’s 
prideful slogan, Islamophobia is a form of xenophobia. SIOE’s blatant embrace of 
xenophobia, moreover, is more than bold rhetoric: it is an act that is made possible by the 
loss of meaning of the term xenophobia, and an accompanying diminishment of moral 
outrage over xenophobic beliefs, attitudes, and acts. 
 To counter xenophobia, many fronts against it should be opened up: it should be 
roundly denounced; social scientists should point out how peoples are pushed and pulled 
across borders by the global capitalism and world politics; ethicists and political theorists 
should debate the moral and political responsibilities that are generated toward 
immigrants and refugees by those international forces; religious organizations should, as 
acts of religious obedience and civil disobedience, provide sanctuary to immigrants and 
refugees; and civil associations should work to counter the strong currents of inhospitality 
that run through society.  
 To counter the dual loss—a loss of both meaning and moral judgment— around 
the idea of xenophobia that SIOE and its ilk take advantage of, the idea of xenophobia 
should be clarified and its moral status explained. That is the task in this piece, which 
focuses on the question, how is xenophobia’s conceptual and moral meaning 
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diminished—how is it sheltered? Investigations of such questions would invigorate 
xenophobia as a topic in public morality and discourage the public’s acquiescence to 
xenophobia’s new prominence. Related questions that should be investigated include, 
what is xenophobia and what is its relation to racism and nativism? What are 
xenophobia’s social and political harms? Xenophobia’s definition and relation to racism 
and nativism is briefly addressed in the following section, and my answer to the question 
of xenophobia’s social and political harms is indicated throughout the paper, but a 
thorough answer to these questions is reserved for a separate treatment.4 In section 2 I 
explain how theories of membership in liberal democratic societies relegate xenophobia 
to a minor moral concern, and, in section three, that the conflation of xenophobia with 
racism disadvantages the former. I claim that how liberal democratic nations imagine 
membership (not surprisingly) and how those nations imagine racism (surprisingly) 
shelters xenophobia. 
<A>Xenophobia as Civic Ostracism 
The core meaning of modern xenophobia is civic ostracism.5 Civic ostracism involves 
exclusion, but also, as the term ostracism denotes, civic banishment: those who are within 
the nation are regarded as not really belonging here, within the abstract, pure, or ideal 
nation.6 It is a subjective belief or affect, usually from the perspective of an individual 
who is, in their imagination, fully rooted in the nation, that some other person or group 
cannot be a part of that nation. These strangers cannot be authentic participants of the 
cultural, linguistic, or religious traditions of the nation they inhabit; they do not derive 
from soil of the nation’s land or the blood of its people. The German word for such an 
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outsider, ausländer, captures the social and political, as well as the geographic and 
natality, senses of being an outsider to the land and its people. 
 This division between the insider and outsider of the nation is illuminated by 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s insight that a division between the “real” and “abstract” nation ran 
through French anti-Semitism.7 The division between those who “really” belong, and 
those whose associations are merely abstract demonstrates the ontological arrogation of 
xenophobia—it is a claim of separate fundamental, as well as social, being. One hand 
there is the “real” nation that includes those with authentic claims bases on blood and 
land, and on the other, there is the “abstract” whose belonging is mediated through law 
and bureaucracy, and includes those whose links are not secured through blood or soil. 
The world of the anti-Semite, or the xenophobe, is divided, and in Fanon’s formulation of 
the colonial world, it is divided into compartments, such that even, or especially in 
colonial zones, where colonial presence is implicitly violent, civic ostracism is enacted 
and enforced.8 
 This division is illustrative of civic ostracism, and is connected to the related ideas 
of “perpetual foreignness” or having a “probationary” belonging. The presence of some 
groups within a nation is considered so inconsistent with the idea of the nation that their 
foreignness seems perpetual, and if they are given an official status, then their belonging 
is probationary, and dependent upon their assimilation.9 The stigma of perpetual 
foreignness or being a probationary member of the nation is most often applied in the 
United States to Asian Americans, Latinos, and increasingly Muslims, and peoples from 
the Middle East, North Africa, or Southeast Asia, or in other words, people who are 
presumed Arab or Muslims. This syndrome in turn illustrates corporeal malediction.10 It 
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is a mismatch between one’s first-person experience of the body and the historical and 
social meaning that is laden on it by one’s condition, circumstances, and society. In the 
case of the perpetual foreigner, corporeal malediction involves important geographical, 
linguistic, and cultural elements: they do not belong here. 
 Xenophobia is a general idea and is strongly related to the sometimes preferred 
term, nativism. Nativism however is conceptually dependent on xenophobia and indicates 
a positive political project to actively exclude or expel those judged to be too foreign to 
belong, or to hoard the national community’s resources and keep them from being 
exploited by foreigners. One can imagine, for example, groups within a nation, or even a 
nomadic group, that expresses xenophobic attitudes without making specific nativist 
claims. Whether, however, one uses “xenophobia” or “nativism” depends on the context 
of the situation and the social-political practice and interests of organizations or 
institutions being examined. 
 Just as xenophobia is distinct from nativism, it is also distinct from racism, and 
this distinction, even when it is poorly made, allows for xenophobia’s double play and its 
moral diminishment. Although the history between racism and xenophobia is deeply 
intertwined, and instances of both are difficult to unravel from each other, there are 
examples of each that need not involve the other. For example, an instance of racism 
without xenophobia would involve some group, such as a national minority that clearly 
belongs in the nation but are treated as racial outsiders by other dominant groups. 
Xenophobia without racism would involve civic ostracism that targets some group within 
the nation for their presumed nationality regardless of race. The rhetorical force of the 
presumption that xenophobia can be separated from racism in arguments that are either 
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anti-immigrant or for the limitation of immigration and refugee rights allows xenophobia 
to be sheltered. One strategy to counter this is to emphasize the links between xenophobia 
and racism. That makes historical and practical sense, but it has some shortcomings, 
which I discuss below. I argue that in addition to anti-racist politics that rebut such 
separation, that anti-xenophobic strategies be engaged. 
 
<A>Nationalism Shelters Xenophobia 
Nations assume a sovereign right to determine individual membership in their nations. 
The rights of residency and citizenship are granted by nations to whom they judge meet 
their constitutional criteria for either. This power is rooted in the idea of national self-
determination—indeed it is the basis of the civic “self” that seeks political autonomy—
and is thus considered fundamental to national sovereignty. In the United States, the right 
to determine membership is instantiated by the judicial branch’s granting of plenary 
power to regulate immigration law to the executive and legislative branches.11 
 The sovereign right to determine membership is embedded in liberal political 
theory: it is present at the constitutive, original moment (both the mythical monumental 
historical and theoretical moments) of the social contract. This embedding is theoretical 
justification, but this political founding myth is not the source of plenary power. The 
source is in the assumption and assertion of national sovereignty over membership, and it 
is backed up (to the degree that it can be, by the enforcement of immigration, 
naturalization, and border security policy). Members of the social contract, through the 
act of constituting the body politic, get to determine membership, with its rights, duties, 
and obligations, in that body. A consequence of this political founding myth of self-
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constitution, is that social justice is defined as fair relations between members; it becomes 
an intra-national idea, and is used, in ideal political theory, to judge and regulate the 
effects of the basic structure of society on members, their life chances, and the 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of society between members.12 Additionally, this 
act of self-constitution, with the power of inclusion and exclusion, is credited with the 
creation of communities of character and meaning: the emergence of a common form of 
worship, languages, manners and mores, narratives and monuments, and virtues and 
values.13 
 The sovereign right to determine membership alone creates many obstacles, some 
justified (a fair and reasonably terminable immigration process) and many not (the 
flouting of international laws and treaties governing migration), to would be refugees and 
immigrants who are seeking shelter, a livelihood, and a guarantee that their basic human 
rights will be honored.14 First, the dynamics of nationalism transforms whole territories—
enormous areas of land and collections of faiths, cultures, and languages—into ours and 
not theirs. The nation state becomes concerned with inclusion and exclusion, with the 
creation and division of friends from enemies.15 Second, it delimits social justice as an 
intra-national idea. Third, immigrants, and those associated with immigrant communities, 
including naturalized citizens or citizens ancestrally related to immigrant groups, are seen 
as a threat to national communities of character and meaning. 
 This narrative is so powerful it has determined modern Western conceptions of 
sanctuary and hospitality. Sanctuary and hospitality are no longer duties or obligations 
derived from religious authority, moral or political theory, or social and environmental 
conditions. No, instead they are now gifts and acts of charity. Nationalism, indeed, makes 
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the modern concept of sanctuary, which is fundamentally incredible on a national scale, 
credible. This is not the sanctuary of Abraham’s tent, or of a home, church or synagogue, 
or community: it is the presumption that a vast nation—despite the massive pulls and 
pushes of the world economy, and its self-interested geopolitical machinations—could 
have the audacity to offer or, more often, deny, with a straight face, sanctuary to 
“outsiders.”16 Additionally, in the years after 9-11, Americans’ frustration with 
immigration from Mexico and Latin America combined with its fear of Arabs and 
Muslims to further transform the idea of sanctuary from a moral burden to a threat to 
national security. American cities that declared that they were “sanctuary cities” (local 
officials, such as the police, would not inquire about the residency or citizenship status of 
residents seeking municipal services) were accused of harboring criminals and potential 
terrorists. Sanctuary is depreciated as a threat to the rule of law.17 
 What I have identified as the second obstacle, the delimitation, or distortion, of 
social justice to an intra-national idea, has further negative effects. First, since the 
ordering of the basic structure of society did not determine the beginning nor the progress 
of the life of the refugee or immigrant, then (within the constraints of ideal political 
theory) their life chances are not a matter of social justice. What has happened to them 
may be a matter of international justice, but it is not the concern of social justice, and is 
not a concern of “ours.” 
 This reasoning is similar to the reasoning of so-called “lifeboat ethics,” the idea 
that each nation is like a lifeboat floating in the sea. Each lifeboat has a specific “carrying 
capacity”—it can hold only so many people—and taking in more than it can hold will 
sink the lifeboat and all its passengers. The moral of its story is that saving those in the 
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water (or incautious sexual reproduction in the boat) endangers everyone else. The 
proponents of lifeboat ethics say to those who want to extend sanctuary, “fine, but you 
will have to make room for those you want to save by jumping overboard yourself!” The 
unfortunates in the water are there presumably because they did not pay attention to the 
carrying capacity of their own lifeboats, or their lifeboats were poorly captained; all the 
same, we are not morally required to save them, because that would be akin to a moral 
obligation to kill oneself. Of course, in this incredibly simple story, the lifeboats float in 
one world, but do not have the complex global environmental, economic, political, and 
social interrelations and interdependencies of actual nations on Earth.18 Our actual 
cosmopolitan or global connections undermine the tenability of this thought experiment 
and reveal it to be either irrelevant to our real conditions or a device in the service of 
moral callousness. 
 The callousness of lifeboat ethics is the kind of moral disregard about noncitizens 
that the delimitation of social justice gives rise to. Although the marginalization of 
immigrants and refugees is mediated by constitutional law, and discouraged by the 
cosmopolitan inclinations of some liberal theories,19 nonetheless, the message to citizens 
is clear: their problems are not ours; as long as we did not push them into the sea, we do 
not have to save them—let them drown.  
 The peril of drowning in some cases is literal; migrants from North Africa and the 
Middle East attempt to boat into Spain and Malta, those from China and South Asia 
attempt the same into Australia, and Haitians into the United States. A few members of 
far-right parties want these boats sunk,20 but most citizens want the migrants detained off 
shore without consideration of their suffering or legitimate claims for asylum. In the 
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desert Southwest of the United States a similar story plays out, but, instead of drowning 
in water, migrants are in danger of dying from the lack of it as they attempt to cross the 
dangerous Sonoran desert. In response, Americans have supported stronger border 
enforcement and crackdowns against undocumented Hispanic and Latino immigrants. 
Moreover, apart the issues of border enforcement and deportation of undocumented 
immigrants, Americans along the Arizona-Mexican border have even fiercely debated the 
morality and legality of leaving water out for the desert-crossers so they do not die of 
dehydration.21 
 The walls that shelter xenophobia within nations are made of callousness. A lack 
of regard for the dignity of immigrants leaves them vulnerable to economic and political 
exploitation and waves of xenophobic persecutions. The populace nurse xenophobic 
attitudes, certain politicians and demagogues gain political capital from whipping up fear 
and resentment toward perceived foreigners and immigrants, and some businesses (those 
that take advantage of an underground economy of low-wage labor or are in the business 
of detaining undocumented immigrants) profit from the ensuing heated, divisive 
rhetoric—this was the process behind Arizona’s controversial immigration law, SB 1070, 
which mandates that all municipal agents, mainly municipal and state police, enforce 
federal immigration law by detaining undocumented immigrants.22 
 Callousness about the fate, livelihood, or rights of immigrants goes beyond them 
to touch the lives of all that are perceived as foreigners. This includes naturalized 
citizens, citizens with one immigrant parent who nevertheless gain citizenship through jus 
sanguinis (the right of blood), and citizens who gain it through jus soli (the right of the 
soil). Especially vulnerable are the native-born minor children of an immigrant or refugee 
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whose access to the rights of citizenship and the benefits of society—and who would 
rightfully and eventually take on the duties of adult citizenship—is imperiled by the 
immigration or refugee status of their parents. In the United States, conservatives, a group 
who typically regard the constitution as sacred and inalterable, seek to repeal the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit recognition of jus soli and provision of birthright 
citizenship. 
 Blood and land, and, apparently, constitutional law, matter little when you look, 
sound, or act like a foreigner. Xenophobic attitudes doom those citizens, who are 
associated with foreignness, a group largely made up of ethnic, racial, and religious 
minorities, to being perpetual foreigners and civic outsiders. Therefore, in the United 
States, Mexican Americans are simply Mexicans, and Asian Americans are Asians. In 
Germany, Turkish Germans are Turks. The Roma, in France and Italy, no matter their 
residency status and despite European Union laws governing immigrations from member 
states, are treated as simply Gypsies and expelled. Throughout the Eastern European 
states and Middle East, Jewish citizens are simply Jews. Likewise, Muslim citizens in 
Europe and America are simply Muslims. They are not us; they are aliens, ausländers, 
perpetually foreign, and a foreign element, even an infection, in the body politic. 
 This puts in context the depth of the despair of German chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s comments in Potsdam to her party members: 
<EXT>We kidded ourselves awhile; we said, “They won’t stay, sometime 
they’ll be gone.” But this isn’t reality. And of course the approach to build 
a multicultural society—to happily live side by side with each other—this 
approach has failed, utterly failed.23 
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 “We” and the “they”—there they are. It is almost incredible that the “they” she is 
brazenly referring to includes citizens. The political leader of one of the major Western 
liberal democratic nations, and Germany no less, is talking about her citizens—and their 
civic belonging, their fundamental relation to the state as citizens—as if they were 
separable from the civic we.24 
 Merkel’s comments demonstrate the awful power of the third obstacle created by 
the sovereign right to determine membership: immigrants and citizens who are regarded 
as perpetual foreigners are seen as a threat to national communities of character and 
meaning. Her comments additionally illustrate how nationalism can nurture xenophobia. 
It can encourage the development of both explicit prejudices and problematic implicit 
attitudes against “foreigners.” When the conditions are right, liberal democratic societies 
are hothouses for xenophobia, nurturing it from a sprout of an attitude to a blossom of 
nativism, a fully developed political ideology. Moreover, apart from deeply committed 
nativists, it can allow xenophobes to hide behind the claim that they do not wish 
foreigners ill; rather they merely do not want them here. Nationalism shelters 
xenophobia.25 
<EXT>National Narratives of Racism Shelter Xenophobia 
The attitudes of citizens toward noncitizens need not be negative, and indeed, Rawls 
thinks that just societies should broadcast a healthy respect toward the citizens of other 
nations as part of the comity of nations.26 The line, however, between citizen and 
noncitizen, and the local emphasis on social justice, demotes concern with noncitizens in 
political and ethical questions. Ethical cosmopolitans decry this demotion, and when such 
denials of equal moral status appear to be based on race, ethnicity, or religion, then they 
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are condemned as xenophobic, nativist, or racist. But xenophobia is a deep, endemic 
problem; pointing to the specter of xenophobia or racism as warning is not sufficient.27 
 The relative weakness28 of xenophobia as a term of moral suasion is a tool in the 
service of those already committed to apathy or to antipathy toward distant suffering 
others, and the charge of racism against noncitizens can be easily deflected. Once 
accusations of racism are evaded, charges of xenophobia offer little traction. This is how 
that double play works: Xenophobia is rhetorically distinguished from racism, and is 
therefore denied the analogical and metaphorical force that racism has in its various 
national contexts. Drawing on well-known national narratives about racism, which in the 
United States is influenced by the black/white binary,29 does not help since those 
portrayals, with their particular contexts (e.g., the U.S. Civil Rights Movement), also 
mark exploitable differences—this is the internal logic of the cynical strategy of 
employing a nonwhite partisan, who is also clearly and enthusiastically a citizen, to 
vouch for the nonracist credentials of the anti-foreigner organization (thus, the 
significance of the black hand in SIOE’s logo). Such rejections of moral analogy between 
xenophobia and racism should not be brushed off as mere rhetoric. It is effective rhetoric 
that connects with other controversies over terms such as illegal alien or illegal 
immigrant.30 
 This process is evident the example of the SIOE slogan discussed above. Their 
website displays an image of a white hand shaking a black one, with acronym and the 
phrase “against racism” framing the image. White and black: that is race is for SIOE and 
racism is the rejection of a group because of apparent color differences. Their complaint 
against Islam, in contrast, is based in their belief that Islam is violently incompatible with 
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democracy, and that Muslims are engaged in a cultural takeover of European civilization. 
This allows room for the SIOE, and its variations across Europe and the United States, to 
make the claim that if they are not racist, then their xenophobia is a product of common 
sense—the desire to protect your life and way of life is rational, and fears about the 
theological-political-cultural threat of Islam are reasonable. 
 There are many responses to SIOE’s depiction of race and racism—it exploits 
naïve biological views of race, it is cynical, and plainly self-serving—yet, it displays my 
basic point: xenophobia does not look like racism, as we have imagined it through our 
national narratives. SIOE uses nationalism and national conceptions of racism to shelter 
their xenophobia. This sheltering of xenophobia through the process of rhetorically 
separating xenophobia from racism is a straightforward example of how the black/white 
binary skews discussions of racism and may even aid in the moral diminution of 
xenophobia. The black-white binary, as I have defined it, is a complex set of at least six 
ideas about the dominant roles of white and black in the U.S. racial system, hierarchy, 
and history. The black/white binary is imagined to be a master key to all things racial. It 
is a key to open up a nation’s racial history and problems, and is central to any potential 
solution to those problems. Although SIOE’s distinguishing of xenophobia from racism is 
a transnational instance of the black/white binary in operation, it dovetails with the 
particular national narratives of racism where versions of the black-white binary have 
guided popular conceptions of racism. The image that SIOE employed clearly 
participates in the second form of the black/white binary, which states that, “racial 
patterns can be empirically described solely using black and white terms.”31 Their naïve 
description of antiracism through the visual representation of clasped black and white 
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hands, and the implied conception of racism as simply prejudice against skin color as a 
mark of visually evident racial difference, metaphorically monopolizes the meaning of 
racism. 
 Perhaps I have surrendered too easily to SIOE’s dichotomy. A critic could argue 
that instead of accepting a distinction between xenophobia and racism, one should reject 
the second premise of SIOE’s argument: “Islamophobia is not racism.” That may be a 
reasonable strategy. Early chapters of the history of racism involve similar attitudes and 
beliefs about both Muslims and Jews. During the years of the Spanish inquisition and the 
spread of anti-Semitism through Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteen 
centuries, Muslims and Jews were targeted by a deadly mix of beliefs: they practiced a 
faith opposed to the “true-faith” of Christianity, when they did convert they did so 
falsely, they were agents of the devil, they were carriers or even instigators of disease and 
ruin, the souls and character of these peoples were marked by God for punishment and 
subservience, they were incapable of being civilized, and so on: they were tainted by the 
mark of Ham. 32 A similar process has occurred with particular instances of xenophobia, 
such as Islamophobia: it blends cultural prejudices against Muslims and Islamic, Arab, 
and Middle Eastern–associated cultures; it demonizes and reduces them to a cultural 
threat to the West or as potential terrorists; and through those processes it ends up 
racializing Arabs, Muslims, Middle Easterners, and those falsely associated with them, 
such as Sikhs.33 This history is not to be denied but drawing on that history is not enough; 
the civic ostracism in the core of this xenophobia needs singling out. As blatantly self-
serving as the SIOE slogan is, it displays how xenophobia-inspired civic ostracism is not 
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based in race per se, and how xenophobia does not look like racism as it has been 
imagined through national narratives. National narratives of racism shelter xenophobia. 
 
<A>Conclusion 
Nationalism shelters xenophobia and so do national narratives of racism. Together they 
operate to perform xenophobia’s double play, which has been used to keep the moral 
status of xenophobia as wrong diminished. In those few cases where xenophobia is 
clearly identified as condemnable, usually after a world-historical event or moment that 
brings the rights of excluded others to high relief (e.g., the fall of Nazi Germany, the U.S. 
Civil Rights Movement, or the end of South African apartheid) the double play reenters 
the national drama to again justify the exclusion of some targeted group. 
 Vigilance, as they say, against these exclusions is in constant need. Xenophobia 
should be denied sanctuary. It should be chased out of from behind its nationalist mask, 
and its co-optation of nationalized antiracist rhetoric. Pro-immigration activism and 
migrant advocates in the United States have, using a variety of strategies, done and 
continue to do this work, but xenophobia as a target of critique should not be obscured 
among in general anti-racist rhetoric. Xenophobia should be, in addition to racism or 
racial or ethnocentric bias be identified and condemned, and its particular harms against 
documented and undocumented immigrants, but also citizens who are presumed-aliens, 
should be identified. Ignoring xenophobia for the sake of a unified, or monisitc, antiracist 
rhetoric plays into xenophobia’s double play. It also underplays how xenophobia directly 
affects, not only documented and undocumented immigrants, but also citizens who are 
presumed-aliens. 
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 Although xenophobia is conceptually prior to nativism and in need of particular 
attention to counter its rise, I do not argue that the term xenophobia should be preferred 
across all contexts and groups over the utilization of the terms racism and nativism. My 
argument that xenophobia needs to be distinguished from racism and nativism is 
motivated by its particulars and likewise by the particular needs of groups affected by it. 
The particularism of this approach is joined with an equal appreciation for 
methodological pluralism. Given the particularism and pluralism of this investigation, I 
am reticent to insist that xenophobia is the one true label for beliefs, attitudes, and actions 
that involve civic ostracism. Political theorists, and more so philosophers, are no position 
to pontificate on what is or is not proper usage of crucial meaning-laden terms in the 
context of real social and political struggles. Fanon’s stinging critique of professors of 
ethics is apropos of this situation: 
<EXT>For a colonized people the most essential value, because of the 
most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring 
them bread and, above all, dignity. But this dignity has nothing to do with 
the dignity of the human individual: for that human individual has never 
heard tell of it. All that the native has seen in his country is that they can 
freely arrest him, beat him, starve him: and no professor of ethics, no 
priest has ever come to be beaten in his place, nor to share their bread with 
him. As far as the native is concerned, morality is very concrete.34</EXT> 
 
 Fanon critiqued an abstract humanism that was a weapon in the hands of French 
colonialism, and, in contrast, he brought our attention to the concrete conditions of 
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colonial oppression. His particularism influences this analysis of xenophobia, and so does 
his injunction that while the role of political theorists is to critique, they should do so 
with a listening ear to those who suffer the oppression, in this case xenophobia, that they 
are attempting to analyze. This analysis, therefore, is meant to be consistent with a broad 
array of anti-racist and anti-xenophobic strategies utilized in the effort to deny 
xenophobia shelter. 
Notes 
                                                
1. This paper benefited from generous and critical comments from audiences at the 
University of Minnesota at Duluth in 2009 and at Penn State’s Rock Ethics Institute’s 
conference on “Critical Philosophy of Race: Intersections with Culture, Ethnicity, and 
Nationality Beyond the Black/White Binary,” in 2010. The ideas in this paper were 
formed through many conversations with David H. Kim and are reflected in our 
coauthored essay “Xenophobia and Racism” (forthcoming, Critical Philosophy of Race). 
An abbreviated version of this paper appeared as Ronald R. Sundstrom, "Sheltering 
Xenophobia," Global Dialogue 12, no. 2 (2010), 
http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=481. [AU: Just fyi, per Press style, 
access dates will not be included. DC] 
2. Does the majority always desire this? That is a good question, however, it is not the 
one I address here. This paper focuses on modern state-centered or even state-sponsored 
xenophobia. My point is that in our present, post-9-11 world, majorities in various 
nations have supported the exclusion of immigrants and those associated with 
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